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ARTICLE
THE KAVANAUGH HEARINGS AND THE
SEARCH FOR A JUST JUSTICE
SUBMISSION
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON*
On October 6, 2018, Brett Kavanaugh was sworn in as a United
States Supreme Court justice.1 His confirmation process had been sui
generis, roiled by charges of sexual assault and extreme partisanship.
Many of his opponents rallied to support Dr. Christine Blasey Ford who
charged the future Justice with having sexually assaulted her in high
school. His supporters, on the other hand, including the President who
nominated him, claimed the process was “very unfair.”2 Indeed, Presi-
dent Trump discounted Ford’s testimony entirely, saying that it was
“very hard for me to imagine that anything happened.”3
However, before we can even analyze the Kavanaugh hearing and
process, we have to step back because there is a lot of history that needs
to be understood before we can appreciate how little we have advanced
since the early 1990s with respect to sexual assault. It had been 27 years
since Anita Hill testified against Justice Clarence Thomas,4 and felt ee-
rily similar. Hill, like Ford, found the Republican senators uninterested
and even hostile to her experience, having already decided that they
* President, American Constitution Society (AMS), 2009.
1 See Biography of the Justices: Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www
.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/biographies-of-the-justices/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2019).
2 Peter Baker & Nicholas Fandos, Kavanaugh’s Supporters and His Accuser Are at an Im-
passe Over Her Testimony, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/us/
politics/kavanaugh-accusations-trump-blasey-ford.html.
3 Id.
4 Elise Viebeck, Here’s What Happened When Anita Hill Testified Against Clarence Thomas
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would vote in favor of Kavanaugh.5 The Democrats too seemed flum-
moxed. Senator Dianne Feinstein, the ranking Democrat on the commit-
tee, sat on Ford’s information for a month before bringing it before the
committee.6 The committee’s discomfort was palpable and might have
seemed a replay of the Thomas hearings, despite so much time passing—
it felt almost as if the #MeToo moment had passed the Senate by.
Moreover, there is other history that is also important to understand
before we can evaluate the “fairness” of the process. The fact that Trump
was able to fill seats on the Supreme Court depended on a strategy of all-
out obstruction by Senate Republican leadership of President Obama’s
nominees in the last two years of his presidency. In an October 2018
piece in The New York Review of Books (TNYRB), historian Christo-
pher R. Browning wrote:
If the US [sic] has someone whom historians will look back on as the
gravedigger of American democracy, it is Mitch McConnell. He
stoked the hyperpolarization of American politics to make the Obama
presidency as dysfunctional and paralyzed as he possibly could. As
with parliamentary gridlock in Weimar, congressional gridlock in the
US [sic] has diminished respect for democratic norms, allowing Mc-
Connell to trample them even more. Nowhere is this vicious circle
clearer than in the obliteration of traditional precedents concerning ju-
dicial appointments.7
McConnell, the Senate Republican leader, aggressively used the fili-
buster8 to block Obama’s nominations. By 2013, there was such a back-
log of executive nominees that the Democratic majority in the Senate, on
a partisan 52-48 margin, passed the “nuclear option.”9 This allowed a
5 Jessica Estepa, Brett Kavanaugh: Who are the Key Votes for Him to Get Confirmed to
Supreme Court?, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2019, 2:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/polit
ics/onpolitics/2018/10/04/brett-kavanaugh-votes-how-many-does-he-need/1522560002/.
6 Sean Sullivan, ‘Why Didn’t She Bring It Up?’: Feinstein Under Scrutiny for Handling of




7 Christopher Browning, The Suffocation of Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 25,
2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/10/25/suffocation-of-democracy/.
8 The term “filibuster” is defined as an attempt to block or delay Senate action on a bill,
nomination, or other matter by debating it at length by offering numerous procedural motions, or by
any other delay or obstructive actions; such delay can be brought to an end by a vote of three-fifths
(usually 60 or more) members of the Senate to bring debate to a close, known as a “cloture” vote.
Filibuster and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/brief-
ing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
9 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nom-
inees, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-
2
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simple majority of 51 votes to confirm Obama’s judicial nominations to
the United States courts of appeals and the lower courts, ending the Sen-
ate’s three-fifths or 60-vote cloture rule for most nominations.10 The
passing of the nuclear option effectively ended the delay of Obama’s
executive branch nominations, including the 17  judicial nominees pend-
ing at the time.11 In 2014, Republicans regained control of the Senate12
chamber allowing McConnell to prevent almost all of Obama’s nominees
from being confirmed with the goal of leaving a significant number of
judgeships unfilled at the end of Obama’s term. Most significantly, Mc-
Connell refused to consider President Obama’s nominee, Judge Merrick
Garland, to fill the seat on the Supreme Court that came open after Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia died in early 2016.13 McConnell said that because it
was an election year, the voters should decide—meaning the next presi-
dent should decide.14 [With Donald Trump as president, McConnell has
recently reversed course, suggesting that a 2020 vacancy would be con-
sidered by the Senate.]15
And with Donald Trump’s election as president in 2016, McConnell
ended the filibuster for Supreme Court nominations—which Democrats
had kept in place—in order to complete the “steal” of Scalia’s seat from
Obama and confirm Trump’s nominee, Neil Gorsuch.16 McConnell
showed his partisan colors during the Kavanaugh hearings; rushing them
despite lacking a vast trove of background information on the nominee
and refusing to allow a full FBI inquiry into the allegations of sexual
assault by several survivors. The midterms were coming.
So, was the process “fair?” Unfortunately, while Republicans de-
cried Ford’s testimony as unfair, they did not actually try to examine
whether Kavanaugh had committed those acts, so how could they know?
At the request of Senator Flake (although multiple Democrats had




11 Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-
use-of-filibuster.html.
12 US Mid-Term Elections: What is at Stake?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-29412354.
13 See Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch, THE AT-
LANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/republicans-nuke-the-
filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/.
14 Id.
15 William Cummings, McConnell Appears Open to Election Year Nomination if Supreme
Court Seat Vacant in 2020, USA TODAY (Oct. 8, 2018, 7:34 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/onpolitics/2018/10/08/supreme-court-mitch-mcconnell-2020/1563328002/.
16 Berman, supra note 13.
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only one of the three sexual assault allegations against Justice Kava-
naugh. The scope of the FBI investigation was limited, and the number
of persons of interest interviewed was only a portion of those named by
Dr. Ford.17 A single copy of the report was made available for senators
to review the day before the vote.18
Senate Republicans also did not think it appropriate to probe his
background as a government lawyer, preventing Democrats from review-
ing the many million pages of documents relating to his role as a White
House lawyer under President George W. Bush.19 The Senate Judiciary
Committee received only 10% of the documents from Justice Kava-
naugh’s time in the Bush White House.20 Bill Burck, who worked under
Kavanaugh in the White House, was tasked with leading a team to re-
view documents before they were sent to the Committee.21 Republicans
alleged that the number of documents received, around 100,000, was
similar to those obtained for Justice Kagan’s hearing, and therefore
should be sufficient.22
17 See Abigail Abrams, Here Are All the People We Know the FBI Talked to for the Kava-
naugh Report, TIME (Oct. 4, 2018), http://time.com/5415845/kavanaugh-fbi-investigation-witness
es/; Jeremy Herb et al., Sources Describe FBI’s Limited Investigation on Kavanaugh, CNN (Oct. 4,
2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/04/politics/fbi-investigation-parameters-kavanaugh/
index.html.
18 Morgan Chalfant & Lydia Wheeler, Five Things to Know About the FBI’s Kavanaugh
Investigation, THE HILL (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/409759-five-
things-to-know-about-the-fbis-kavanaugh-investigation?amp.
19 See Erin Kelly, Senate Digs Through Record 1 Million Pages of Documents on Supreme
Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh, USA TODAY (July 31, 2018, 7:55 AM), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/politics/2018/07/31/senate-digs-through-record-1-million-pages-documents-kavan
augh/864516002/.
20 Letter from all 10 Democratic Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dianne Fein-
stein, Patrick J. Leahy, Richard J. Durbin, Sheldon Whitehouse, Amy Klobuchar, Christopher A.
Coons, Richard Blumenthal, Mazie K. Hirono, Cory A. Booker, and Kamala D. Harris) to Chairman
Chuck Grassley (Aug. 28, 2018), available at Judiciary Committee Democrats Protest Withholding
of Kavanaugh Documents, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.judiciary
.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/judiciary-committee-democrats-protest-withholding-of-kavanaugh-
documents.
21 See Seung Min Kim, Clearinghouse for Kavanaugh Documents is a Bush White House




22 See generally Salvador Rizzo, Fact-Checking the Bipartisan Spinfest on Brett Kavanaugh’s
Time at the White House, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2018/08/15/fact-checking-bipartisan-spinfest-brett-kavanaughs-time-white-house/?utm_term
=.c53b4490ae7c (discussing that Justice Kagan had 170,000 pages of White House documents re-
viewed for her Supreme Court nomination hearing; whereas for Kavanaugh’s hearing a comparable
number of pages were reviewed, however, his grand total of White House documents was signifi-
cantly more than Kagan, with over 3 million pages of documents).
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Among these documents are the significant policy decisions by the
George W. Bush White House, including signing statements.23 Bush’s
administration pushed an aggressive view of the presidency through
these statements, claiming that over 1000 provisions were unconstitu-
tional incursions on Article II powers.24 In fact, when Kavanaugh was
nominated in 2006 to the U.S. Court of Appeals, he was grilled on the
statement dealing with torture of detainees, but there are many other
statements that collectively lay out breathtaking claims—and “baseless,
unprecedented, and sometimes bizarre assertions of presidential power”
according to constitutional scholar Peter Shane.25
But as much as the process should concern those who think we
should know the background of someone ensconced in a job for life,
especially one with so much power, we should be even more concerned
about our new justice’s approach to constitutional and statutory interpre-
tation. Justice Kavanaugh’s approach to constitutional interpretation
could be defined as “loose” originalism and textualism. That is, he re-
sorts to the theories when they lead to the right conclusions, conservative
ones. His opinions as an appellate judge and his other writings wave the
flag for those theories without being strict in their application. This is the
most dangerous and utilitarian approach to constitutional theory.
In his book, The Living Constitution, Professor David Strauss pro-
vides a thorough rebuke to originalism, pointing out the many flaws and
problematic outcomes.26 For example, Strauss explains that under an
originalist approach, the Supreme Court could not have found “separate
but equal” unconstitutional as it did in Brown v. Board of Education.27
Few people could seriously argue that the nineteenth-century framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment meant to attack segregated schools in the
Amendment.28 Even Justice Scalia had to admit that his approach did not
always work, calling himself a “faint-hearted originalist.” After all, he
confessed, “I am an originalist. I am not a nut.”29 Other died-in-the-wool
originalists confess that it is a leaky vessel. According to Georgetown
Law Professor Randy Barnett, sometimes the words alone do not answer
a contemporary question due to facts that would not have been thought
23 Peter M. Shane, The Senate Must Closely Examine These Documents from Kavanaugh’s




26 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
27 Id.; see also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 STRAUSS, supra note 26, at 25.
29 Molly McDonough, Scalia: ‘I Am Not a Nut,’ ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 8, 2008, 2:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_im_not_a_nut.
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possible to the eighteenth-century authors.30 The text is often vague, how
are we to understand what is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment when customs agents grab someone’s cell phone? Barnett
admits that the Constitution “does not say everything one needs to know
to resolve all possible cases and controversies.”31 How judges evaluate
cases under these circumstances is something even originalists do not
agree on among themselves.32 However, they do tend to agree that all the
results should be conservative.
Similarly, on federalism, Kavanaugh favors state power and limits
on the federal government—except when he doesn’t. “If we get a textu-
alist, originalist justice, then we’re likely to get a judge who thinks feder-
alism is important, and that means someone who thinks diversity among
the 50 states is a part of our constitutional structure,” says Barnett.33
Which could mean “an increased reigning in of one-size-fits-all federal
policies.”34 Kavanaugh is likely to allow states and localities to use ag-
gressive law enforcement tactics instead of supporting a protective
Fourth Amendment, and he believes states can restrict reproductive
rights for women.
In his first case in the Court dealing with abortion, Kavanaugh re-
vealed his interest in cutting back on access to abortion. By a 5–4 vote,
in June Medical Services v. Gee, the Court enjoined a Louisiana statute
that would have ended almost all abortions in the state.35 Chief Justice
John Roberts and the four liberals blocked the law.36 It should have been
a unanimous decision as the Louisiana law was virtually the same as the
one struck down in the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling, Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt.37 To express his disagreement with upholding a
precedent of less than two-years-old, Kavanaugh penned a dissent argu-
ing that the law should be allowed to stand;38 something Mark Joseph
Stern in Slate calls “an opinion that should not be taken as anything less
30 Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 71-72
(2011).
31 Id. at 69.
32 MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVA-
TIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS 10 (2013).




35 June Med. Servs. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019).
36 Id.; Mark Joseph Stern, Brett Kavanaugh Just Declared War on Roe v. Wade, SLATE (Feb.
7, 2019, 11:15 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/brett-kavanaugh-june-medical-servi
ces-louisiana-john-roberts.html.
37 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
38 June Med. Servs., 139 S. Ct. 663.
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than a declaration of war on Roe v. Wade.”39 He asserted in his dissent
that the Fifth Circuit was correct that Louisiana should have been al-
lowed to enforce the law because the plaintiffs had not worked hard
enough to get the surgical privileges required by the law.40 As Stern
writes,
This is classic Kavanaugh. On the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, Kavanaugh had a penchant for pretending to
apply Roe while finding arbitrary reasons to uphold abortion restric-
tions. Kavanaugh let the Trump administration prevent an undocu-
mented minor from terminating her pregnancy, on the laughable
theory that she could find a sponsor who would remove her from gov-
ernment custody, where she could reassert control over her body. It
was a pseudo-moderate procedural solution that had the effect of de-
nying the undocumented minor abortion access altogether. Here, Kav-
anaugh made the same play, pretending like he’d found a reasonable
middle ground that, in reality, serves to rubber-stamp unconstitutional
abortion laws.41
However, when it comes to gun regulation, Justice Kavanaugh has a
different view and federalism goes out the window. Similarly, he favors
business interests over localism; for example, supporting the position that
the First Amendment protects the rights of internet service providers
whose speech rights apparently suffer from net neutrality.42 And employ-
ers will find a willing ally in their efforts to preempt local minimum
wage and sick leave ordinances.43
On executive power, what we know so far of Justice Kavanaugh’s
record suggests he will be extremely deferential to the President. The
new Justice replaces Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who helped affirm
detainee rights in landmark cases during the George W. Bush administra-
tion.44 Kavanaugh brings a long record in this area, very different from
that of Kennedy’s. His 12-year tenure on the D.C. Circuit Court shows
broad deference to presidential powers on national security and war.45
He consistently embraced a limited view of the courts’ ability to chal-
39 Stern, supra note 36; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40 June Med. Servs., 139 S. Ct. 663.
41 Stern, supra note 36.
42 Vyse, supra note 33.
43 See id.
44 Stephen I. Vladeck, One Huge Difference Between Kavanaugh and Kennedy: Their Guan-
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lenge the executive branch in that area.46 Kavanaugh could be the critical
vote on questions that arise from the government’s controversial use of
the law known as the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),
to justify military incursions against the Islamic State. Critics say the law
does not provide justification for such operations.47 Of singular impor-
tance in Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence is his skepticism of the relevance of
international law in establishing limits to presidential powers. In a
lengthy opinion in Al-Bihani v. Obama, Kavanaugh wrote that interna-
tional law cannot limit presidential power to fight Al-Qaeda, and other
militant groups, or to hold detainees.48 These views could spill over to
other areas, including privacy and surveillance.
With respect to checks and balances—a central element of the
U.S.’s constitutional structure—Kavanaugh has repeatedly questioned
pivotal Supreme Court decisions that limit out-of-control presidential
power (such as the Watergate tapes case) and has a history of controver-
sial statements that suggest he believes the Constitution bars a special
counsel from investigating a president.49 When meeting with Leader
Schumer prior to his confirmation, Kavanaugh not only refused to an-
swer crucial questions about health care and women’s reproductive
rights, he also refused “to affirm that a President must comply with a
duly issued subpoena, even in a criminal investigation that concerns na-
tional security.”50 Many believe he was chosen because of these ideas—
with the Mueller investigation ongoing. Kavanaugh, along with the other
conservative justices, is being counted on to protect the President against
charges of obstruction of justice and collusion with a foreign power.
As President Trump, his allies, and legal team continue to attack and
try to undermine Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation, Trump’s per-
sonal attorney and former Mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani, has
said that he plans to fight a potential subpoena all the way to the Su-
preme Court. It is possible that the Supreme Court could soon be faced
46 Id.; see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 9-53 (2010); Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d
757, 759-774 (2016); In re Al-Nashiri, No. 14-5229, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22038, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 18, 2014), https://dccircuitbreaker.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/14-1203.pdf; Omar v. Mc-
Hugh, 646 F.3d 13 (2011); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (2009).
47 See generally Vladeck, supra note 44; Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 9.
48 Jonathan Hafetz, Judge Kavanaugh’s Record in National-Security Cases, SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 29, 2018, 11:02 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-na
tional-security-cases/; Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 9.
49 See Hafetz, supra note 48.
50 164 Cong. Rec. S5873, 141 (2018), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/08/23/CREC-
2018-08-23-senate.pdf.
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with “a decision as to whether a sitting president can be subpoenaed or
indicted,” a question the Court has yet to answer.51
His views on executive power are consistent with the extreme views
he takes on administrative law. The Chevron decision, under which
courts are supposed to give deference to agency expertise, is one he
firmly disagrees with.52 In a speech at Notre Dame, he said that “[t]he
Chevron doctrine encourages agency aggressiveness on a large scale,”53
repeating an argument from his Harvard Law Review article from the
prior year.54 “Under the guise of ambiguity, agencies can stretch the
meaning of statutes enacted by Congress to accommodate their preferred
policy outcomes.”55
On many issues, the public is becoming more liberal—such as with
rights pertaining to sexual orientation, gender roles, the environment, and
race for example—as well as more diverse (and younger). A Supreme
Court and a federal judiciary that represents an extreme minority view-
point and has the power to thwart the majority poses a threat to the
American system of checks and balances, and potentially to our
democracy.
As Christopher R. Browning wrote, “No matter how and when the
Trump presidency ends, the specter of illiberalism will continue to haunt
American politics. A highly politicized judiciary will remain, in which
close Supreme Court decisions will be viewed by many as of dubious
legitimacy, and future judicial appointments will be fiercely contested.”56
51 Schumer Floor Remarks on the Need for Republicans to Stand Up to President Trump,
Delaying Judge Kavanaugh’s Hearing, and the Danger of Government Funding of Guns for Teach-
ers, SENATE DEMOCRATS (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/news/press-releases/
schumer-floor-remarks-on-the-need-for-republicans-to-stand-up-to-president-trump-delaying-judge-
kavanaughs-hearing-and-the-danger-of-government-funding-of-guns-for-teachers.
52 See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
53 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Two Challenges for the Judge as Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity and
Constitutional Exceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1911 (2017); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
54 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
55 Kavanaugh, supra note 53.
56 Browning, supra note 7.
9
Fredrickson: The Kavanaugh Hearings
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
76 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol49/iss2/2
